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I. INTRODUCTION
1

“Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” —this country is
founded on the rights of the individual. As a nation of immigrants,
2
these rights extend to all persons within the United States.
Kestutis Zadvydas and Kim Ho Ma are two of nearly 3,500 resident
3
aliens who have committed crimes and served their sentences.
Subsequently ordered deported by the Attorney General, they have
† William Mitchell College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2003.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776).
2. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). See infra
Part II.
3. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See also Lourdes M. Guiribitey,
Comment, Criminal Aliens Facing Indefinite Detention Under INS: An Analysis of the
Review Process, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 275, 275-76 (2001) (discussing the review
process available to the nearly 3,500 criminal aliens awaiting deportation).
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been detained because their host nations refuse to accept them
based on the lack of international agreements with the United
4
States. Claiming an infringement to their fundamental right to
liberty, the aliens presented the Supreme Court with the
5
constitutional issue of indefinite detainment. Part II discusses
both the common law and legislative history of 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), which authorizes the Attorney General to detain
6
criminal aliens. Part III discusses the majority and dissenting
7
opinions in detail. Part IV analyzes the Court’s decision in light of
8
constitutional demands and the ramifications of the decision, and
Part V concludes that the Court correctly interpreted the statute,
but also notes that the recent terrorist attacks greatly influenced
9
the implementation of the Court’s decision. Ultimately, the Court
maintained liberty as an inherent fundamental right to United
States residents.
II. DEPORTING ALIENS: HISTORY OF 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)
A. Common Law
In 1889, the Supreme Court held that the right to exclude
10
aliens was “incident to every independent nation,” and the
government’s right to exercise immigration power was free of
11
constitutional limits. As a result, the Court refused to intervene
and deferred immigration decisions to other governmental
12
branches. This holding was extended in 1893 in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, to allow Congress the plenary authority to also deport
13
resident aliens from the United States. As a result, the powers to
14
exclude and deport were classified as one and the same. Three
4. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 682-87.
5. Id. at 689.
6. See infra Parts II.A and II.B and accompanying notes.
7. See infra Parts III.B and III.C and accompanying notes.
8. See infra Part IV. and accompanying notes.
9. See infra Part V. and accompanying notes.
10. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
11. Id. at 604-05.
12. Id. See also Victoria Cook Capitaine, Life in Prison Without a Trial: The
Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United States, 79 TEX . L. REV. 769, 775 (2001).
13. 149 U.S. 698, 711-13 (1893).
14. Id. at 713. See also Marisel Acosta, “Unremovable” Criminal Resident Aliens
Awaiting Deportation: Can the INS Detain them Indefinitely?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1363,
1370-71 (2000).
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years later, however, the Supreme Court limited this holding by
extending Fifth Amendment protections to every “person” in the
15
United States, including aliens. Ten years later, the government’s
16
power was further limited by Yamataya v. Fisher, which held that
17
aliens are guaranteed procedural Due Process.
In 1952, the Supreme Court further addressed the
18
government’s power of alien detention. In Carlson v. Landon, the
Court held that the detention of aliens prior to deportation
proceedings was justified if it served a legitimate governmental
19
interest. On the same day the Court also decided Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, in which deportation itself was challenged rather than
20
detention. These aliens believed that, as permanent resident
aliens, they were entitled to the same Due Process rights as citizens,
21
and thus they had the right to stay in the United States. The
Court ultimately concluded that Due Process could not be used as a
shield to deportation because “it would unjustly deprive Congress
22
of its power to protect the nation’s welfare.”
In 1953, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Court
specifically addressed the indefinite detention of excludable
23
aliens. The Court followed the entry fiction theory and drew a
distinction between the rights afforded to excludable aliens and the
24
rights afforded to deportable aliens. Ultimately, the Court held
15. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896) (discussing how
government has the plenary power to remove resident aliens, but not the power to
deprive constitutional protections while awaiting deportation).
16. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
17. Id. at 100-01. The Court held the fundamental principle of Due Process
included the right “that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
opportunity, at some time, to be heard . . . .” Id. at 101. In this case, however, the
Court held that the alien seeking admission had been afforded procedural Due
Process. Id. at 101-02.
18. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
19. Id. at 541. This case was decided in an era of Communist threat and
specifically dealt with the pre-hearing detention of alleged Communist aliens.
Though these aliens were entitled to full procedural protection under Yamataya,
the Court held that the governmental interest of protecting the public from
Communist threat justified the detainment of these aliens. Id.
20. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
21. Id. at 584.
22. Id. at 590-91. This case was also decided during the era of Communist
threat, and these aliens were determined deportable as former members of the
Communist party. Though the Court recognized that the deportation policy was
severe, Congress could not be denied the power to protect the welfare of the
United States. Id.
23. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
24. Id. at 212-13. The Court stated:
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that Mezei was an alien standing “on the threshold of initial
25
entry,” and that therefore continued detention by the Attorney
26
General was in accordance with statutory authority. Eventually,
the Court continued to follow the entry fiction doctrine and
27
differentiated the rights of excludable and deportable aliens. The
Court emphasized that an alien subject to a deportation order had
28
substantive rights which are unavailable to an inadmissible alien.
This common law history affirmed the government’s role of
establishing immigration policy, while ensuring that it conformed
29
to the standards set forth in the constitution.

It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to
traditional standards of fairness encompassed in Due Process of law.
But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different
footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is Due
Process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.
Id. at 212 (citations omitted). First established in Mezei, courts have labeled this
theory “entry fiction.” The entry fiction doctrine authorizes courts to treat an
alien in an exclusion proceeding as if the alien had not gained admission to the
United States. Therefore, the alien is not entitled to constitutional protections
granted to those who are within the United States’ boundaries. In contrast,
deportable aliens are entitled to greater constitutional protections because they
have already passed through the “threshold of entry.” E.g., Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d
815, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2000). The INS also adopted this classification. These two
categories helped the INS determine which procedures to follow, since less review
is available to excludable aliens whereas deportable aliens are entitled to greater
protection. In 1996 legislation renamed it the “theory of admission” and classified
excludable aliens as “inadmissible” and deportable aliens as “removable.” This
reform legislation was intended to ultimately “purge” the United States of
inadmissible aliens. Alexander Chopin, Comment, Disappearing Due Process: The
Case of Indefinitely Detained Permanent Residents’ Retention of their Constitutional
Entitlement Following a Deportation Order, 49 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1267-69 (2000); see also
infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
25. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.
26. Id. at 210-11. See generally Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 933, 954-84 (1995) (discussing that both Mezei and Knauff (United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 388 U.S. 537 (1950)) represent the “modern zenith of
the plenary power doctrine,” as the government has absolute authority with
respect to exclusion matters).
27. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
28. Id. at 26.
29. See generally Acosta, supra note 14, at 1370-76 (discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court common law history of immigration).
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B. Legislative History
The Constitution grants Congress the authority to establish a
30
“uniform rule of naturalization.”
The Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) governs the deportability of aliens, and
31
has been frequently revised throughout its history. In response to
the influx of immigrants, Congress enacted the Immigration Act of
32
1917 to provide regulatory standards for immigration. Under this
Act, Congress established no time limit for effecting deportation,
33
and thus aliens were detained until deportation was successful.
Congress amended this Act in 1952, and imposed a six-month time
34
limit to detention following a final order of deportation. This sixmonth time limit remained in effect until the 1990 amendment,
which barred release of aggravated felons under a final order of
35
deportation. For the first time, the Attorney General had the
36
statutory authority to indefinitely detain certain aliens.
In 1996, Congress enacted the most sweeping changes to the
INA. Fears of terrorism, job loss, and increasing crime figures
encouraged the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
37
Penalty Act (AEDPA).
The AEDPA expanded the custodial
authority of the Attorney General, repealing the 1952 statute that
38
required the Attorney General to release criminal aliens. It also
eliminated judicial review previously available to deportable aliens,
and authorized more restrictive detention provisions for
39
deportable aliens. However, harshly criticized for constitutional

30. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 4.
31. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2001).
32. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 156 (1917)) (repealed 1952).
33. Id. § 19, 39 Stat. 889.
34. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 166
(amended 1990) (formerly 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c)(1952)). Case law further followed
this strict interpretation, prohibiting detention of aliens beyond six months. Johns
v. Dep’t of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 890 (5th Cir. 1981).
35. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 504(a),
104 Stat. 5049 (amended 1996) (formerly 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(A) & (B) (Supp. II
1990)).
36. Id.
37. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.) [hereinafter ADEPA]; Chopin, supra note 24, at 1276-78.
38. AEDPA (repealing INA § 242(a)(2)(b), 66 Stat. 208 (1952) (formerly 8
U.S.C. § 1252)).
39. Id.; See also Chopin supra note 24, at 1277.
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40

defects, it was again amended in 1996 under the Illegal
41
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).
The IIRIRA restored the Attorney General’s discretionary
42
authority. Eliminating mandated detention pending removal, the
Act permitted the Attorney General to release criminal aliens who
43
met specific statutory requirements. Interpreting the statute, the
INS imposed the burden upon the alien to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that she is not a threat to the community
44
and is likely to comply with removal orders. If the alien meets this
burden, it is still within the Attorney General’s discretion to grant
45
release.
These custody review procedures were further supplemented
in 1999. The INS issued Interim Procedures regarding the
implementation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, which accompanied 8 U.S.C. §
46
1231(a)(6), in a memorandum authored by Michael Pearson.
40. Chopin, supra note 24, at 1279.
41. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRIRA]. This amendment created 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a) by transferring the criminal alien detention provisions from 8 U.S.C. §
1252 (a)(2) (as amended by AEDPA). See generally Amy Langenfeld, Comment,
Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of Immigrants Under the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041, 1041-63 (1999)
(discussing the IIRIRA and implications of the Act with respect to human rights,
Due Process and the separation of powers).
42. IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-546.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1999). This statute outlined procedures
for the INS to follow. Criminal aliens must be detained during removal hearings.
Id. at §1231(a)(2). If an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General has
ninety days to effect deportation. Id. at §1231(a)(1)(A). If deportation is not
immediately available, the INS has further review procedures. If removal is
unsuccessful within ninety days, the aliens are generally released under the
Attorney General’s supervision. Id. at §1231 (a)(3). However, the Attorney
General still retains the discretion to continue detention if it is determined that
the alien is a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with removal orders. Id.
As a result of this legislation, more criminal aliens are detained and deported by
the INS than under previous statutes. Further, more aliens are indefinitely
detained than before. M. Gavan Montague, Note, Should Aliens be Indefinitely
Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231? Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under
Renewed Scrutiny, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1439, 1444-45 (2001).
44. Chopin, supra note 24, at 1280.
45. Id. When using discretion to grant release, the Attorney General may
evaluate the factors set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. These regulations were enacted
to serve as a guide for the INS to invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 8 C.F.R. § 241.4.
See also Chopin, supra note 24, at 1280.
46. Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, INS, United States Department of
Justice, Detention Procedures for Aliens Whose Immediate Repatriation is Not
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Entitled the “Pearson Memorandum,” it established guidelines for
INS district directors to consider when determining whether
47
district directors should release aliens from custody. Following
the circuit court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Underdown, the INS again
issued a final rule establishing permanent, post order custody
48
review procedures for detained aliens awaiting removal. The
purpose of this rule was to balance the need to protect the
American public from dangerous aliens with the humanitarian
concerns arising from another country’s unjustified refusal to
49
accept the return of its nationals. Though the INS was hopeful
that these procedures would remedy any constitutional invalidity,
50
the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis would require
51
another revision.

Possible or Practicable (Feb. 3, 1999), available at
http://www.ins.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/detlong.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2001).
47. Id.; Elizabeth Larson Beyer, Comment, A Right or Privilege: Constitutional
Protection for Detained Deportable Aliens Refused Access or Return to Their Native
Countries, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1032-35 (2000). The Pearson Memo
random provided for an automatic review before and after the ninety-day statutory
removal period, and required mandatory review every six months to determine if a
change in circumstances warranted release. The alien could only appeal a district
director’s discretionary decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals if the alien
initiated the detention review by written request. Otherwise, discretionary
detention could continue. Pearson, supra note 46.
48. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4.
49. Id. Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,281 (Dec. 21,
2000). This rule establishes “permanent procedures” for post-order custody
reviews, and aids the decision maker in determining whether a candidate is
eligible for release from custody following the expiration of the removal period.
Id. at 80,282. These procedures were modeled after 8 C.F.R. § 212.12 (pertaining
to Mariel Cubans) and consist of records review, panel interview and
recommendation opportunities, and a final decision by a separate Service
Headquarters Unit (HQPDU). Id. See also INS Issues Final Rule Establishing Custody
Review Procedures for Detained Aliens, 78 No. 2 INTERPRETER RELEASES 42 (Jan. 8,
2001).
50. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
51. H.R. 2772, 107th Cong. (2001); Post-Order Custody Review after
Zadvydas v. Davis, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,433 (July 24, 2001); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4
(incorporating amendments at 66 Fed. Reg. 56,976-77 (Nov. 14, 2001)); see infra
Part IV. and accompanying notes.
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III. THE ZADVYDAS DECISION
A. The Facts
In separate writs of certiorari, Kestutis Zadvydas appealed the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision authorizing his continued
detainment by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
and the Attorney General appealed a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision prohibiting the continued detention of Kim Ho
Ma. For purposes of argument, the two cases were consolidated
into one case for the United States Supreme Court to review.
Kestutis Zadvydas, a resident alien, was born to Lithuanian
52
parents in a displaced persons camp in Germany in 1948. At the
age of eight, Zadvydas immigrated with his parents and other
53
family members to the United States and has lived here ever since.
He has a long criminal record, including juvenile convictions for
car theft and trespass, and convictions as an adult for attempted
54
robbery, auto theft, attempted burglary, and drug crimes. In
addition, Zadvydas has a history of flight from both criminal and
55
deportation proceedings.
In 1994, Zadvydas was ordered
deported to Germany after being convicted for possession with the
56
intent to distribute cocaine.
Following the deportation order, Germany informed the INS
that it would not accept Zadvydas because he was not a German
57
citizen. Lithuania also denied Zadvydas acceptance because he
58
was neither a Lithuanian resident nor citizen. In 1996, the INS
asked the Dominican Republic to accept Zadvydas based on his
59
wife’s citizenship, which they declined. Zadvydas then applied for
Lithuanian citizenship based on his parents’ citizenship, and at the
time of the Supreme Court judgment, the reapplication was still
60
pending.

52. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684 (2001).
53. Id.
54. Id. His criminal record spans twenty-eight years (his first conviction was
in 1966 and final conviction was in 1994). Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp.
1011, 1014-15 (E.D. La. 1997).
55. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Following the deportation order of 1994, the INS detained
61
Zadvydas beyond the sanctioned removal period. In September
1995, Zadvydas filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
62
63
2241 challenging his continued detention as unconstitutional.
The magistrate denied Zadvydas’ request for habeas corpus relief,
and Zadvydas appealed to the District Court of the Eastern District
64
of Louisiana. The district court reversed the magistrate, holding
that the indefinite detention of Zadvydas absent a reasonable
likelihood of deportation violated his rights to substantive Due
65
Process, and that it was an “excessive means” of imposing the
66
purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
The INS appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed the district court.67 It found two grounds by which the
government may detain a resident alien: the danger posed to the
61. Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 establishes federal court power to grant writs of habeas
corpus. Section (c)(3) extends the right of habeas corpus to prisoners if they are
held in violation of the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(2001).
63. Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (E.D. La. 1997). Zadvydas
asserted that his continued detention was unconstitutional based on four main
arguments, which the court rejected. Id. Magistrate Judge Moore held that
Zadvydas was made aware of his constitutional rights, knowingly participated in his
proceeding, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Id. Moore also held that
the continued detainment did not violate international law, or Due Process, and
further held the Attorney General exercised authority within his discretion. Id.
Finally, the court concluded that the Eighth Amendment was not violated because
the INS was continually attempting to effectuate deportation, rendering
Zadvydas’s continued detention not indefinite. Id.
64. Id. Zadvydas asserted that the magistrate erred in finding that the
original proceeding comported with Due Process and in finding that continued
detainment was constitutional. Id. at 1015. The district court interpreted
Zadvydas’s claim as presenting the question “whether a legal alien who is under
final order of deportation may be permanently incarcerated because the INS
cannot find a country to take him.” Id. at 1023-24.
65. Id. at 1027. The district court agreed with the INS, holding that the
language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and the absence of a time limit on detention
suggested that indefinite detention of deportable aliens who are aggravated felons
is authorized when: 1) immediate deportation is not possible and 2) the alien has
failed to show that he is not a threat to the community or that he will show up at
scheduled hearings. Id. at 1024-25. Further, the governmental policy of
protecting the community from aggravated felons warranted the deprivation of
Zadvydas’s liberty. Id. at 1026. However, the court concluded that once the
purpose of detention (to effect deportation) is not achievable in the future,
confinement is no longer a temporary measure but that of permanent
confinement, and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 1027.
66. Id.
67. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 297 (5th Cir. 1999).
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community by the detainee, or by the risk of flight of the detainee,
so long as good faith efforts to effectuate deportation continued
and reasonable parole and periodic review procedures are
68
effectively administered. Zadvydas was detained pursuant to 8
69
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). The U.S. Supreme Court granted Zadvydas’s
appeal on writ of certiorari.70
Kim Ho Ma was born in Cambodia in 1977, and eventually
71
immigrated to the United States at the age of seven. In 1995, at
the age of seventeen, Ma was convicted of manslaughter and
72
sentenced to thirty-eight months. Ma served two years of his
73
sentence, and was released into INS custody. Under statute 8
74
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), Ma was classified as an aggravated felon.
75
Ma’s conviction made him removable. While under INS custody,76
the ninety-day removal period expired, yet Ma remained detained
77
because of his criminal involvement.
In 1999, Ma filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 to the Federal District Court for the Western District of
78
Washington. The court held that the Constitution forbids post68. Id. at 296-97. The court also noted governmental policy plays a significant
role in the decision to detain an aggravated felon. Id. If deportation is blocked,
the alien may commit crimes against the general public, which would have been
prevented, had the alien been detained or successfully deported. Id. Allowing
criminal aliens to remain in the United States is a continuing violation of
immigration laws. Id. Deportation is the preferred method of ending this
violation, but detention is an acceptable alternative to achieving this goal. Id.
Further, allowing criminal aliens to roam free while efforts are made to complete
deportation may result in the disappearance of the criminal aliens within the
country, and thus unsuccessful deportation. Id.
69. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684 (2001). This statute authorizes the
Attorney General to detain specific aliens beyond the removal period. These
aliens are classified under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 and 8 U.S.C. § 1227, and are considered
criminal or inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2001).
70. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678.
71. Id. at 685.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2001) (classifying criminal aliens as aggravated
felons by their convictions).
75. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), an alien ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) may be
detained by the Attorney General beyond the removal period. 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6) (2001).
76. Ma, 208 F.3d. at 819.
77. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) further authorized this
continued detainment. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2001).
78. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685. See also supra note 62 (discussing when writs of
habeas corpus are available to prisoners).
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removal detainment unless there is a reasonable chance of
79
successful deportation.
The court then held an evidentiary
hearing, concluding that there was no reasonable chance of
successful deportation of Ma to Cambodia and ordered Ma
80
released. The Attorney General appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
which affirmed and concluded that the statute did not authorize
detention beyond a “reasonable time” of the 90-day detention
81
period authorized for removal. The United States Supreme Court
granted the government’s appeal on writ of certiorari.82
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded both the Ninth
83
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit decisions.
The Court read an
implicit limitation into the statute, only allowing the Attorney
General to detain an alien beyond the post-removal period for an
amount of time reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s
84
removal. The Court further held that the Attorney General was
not entitled to indefinitely detain these aliens pending their
85
removal.
79. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686. The lack of a repatriation agreement between
the United States and a foreign country renders successful deportation almost
impossible. See id. at 686.
80. Id. at 686. The Court held that there was no reasonable chance of
deportation to Cambodia based on the nonexistence of a repatriation treaty
between the United States and Cambodia. Id. at 687.
81. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court has long held
that the court is an interpreter of statutes in accordance with constitutional
standards, which is the “paramount principle of judicial restraint.” Ma, 208 F.2d at
822; United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 673 (9th Cir. 1991). The court held
that the statute should be construed as such to avoid constitutional problems.
Specifically, a greater specification by Congress is necessary to conclusively justify
indefinite detainment. Id.
82. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678.
83. Id. at 702.
84. Id. at 689. The court further interpreted reasonable time to be a period
of six months. Id. at 702. See also Matthew E. Hedberg, Note & Comment, Kim Ho
Ma v. Reno: Cloaking Judicial Activism as Constitutional Avoidance, 76 WASH. L. REV.
669, 672-74 (2001) (discussing the legislative history of the current 1231(a)(6)).
See also infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
85. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. However, the Court did not limit the Attorney
General’s authority with respect to terrorist individuals or other “special
circumstances” where indefinite detention may be warranted. Id. at 696. Though
the Court imposed a six-month time limit, it stated: “This six-month presumption,
of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six
months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been
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The Court’s decision was five to four. The opinion, written by
Justice Breyer, addressed the major arguments raised by the
86
government. The Court addressed Due Process concerns, the
constitutional rights afforded to the detainees, the justification for
judicial review, Congress’s intent and the history behind 8 U.S.C. §
1231. Finally, the Court focused on the theory of constitutional
avoidance, and held that indefinite detention was not warranted
87
and thus imposed the reasonable time standard.
The Court began with the Fifth Amendment, considering the
88
liberty interests of resident aliens. The Court held that unless the
detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate
procedural protections, or in specific circumstances in which
89
special justifications outweigh the individual’s liberty interest, the
determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Id. at 701.
86. First, the Court validated its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (authorizing an individual to claim in federal court that he or
she is being held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws. . . of the
United States”). The jurisdiction of the federal courts was challenged under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to
review” decisions “specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The distinction here, the Court held, was that the
detained aliens were not challenging the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion
but rather the Attorney General’s authority under the post-removal-period
detention statute. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688.
87. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. Constitutional avoidance is followed when an
act of Congress raises a serious doubt as to its constitutionality. Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (holding when the validity of a congressional act is
questioned, and even if doubt of constitutionality is raised, “it is a cardinal
principle” of the Court to construe the statute to avoid this constitutional
question). See, e.g., Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 822 (1999) (following the Supreme
Court’s holding that interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional questions is the
“paramount principle of judicial restraint”); United States v. Xcitement Video,
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994) (discussing the role of Congress to pass legislation that
is consistent with the Constitution and should be construed as such by the Court).
As a result, the Court will determine if a certain construction of the statute may
avoid invalidation for unconstitutionality. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682; Crowell, 285
U.S. at 62; see also United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 195, 202 (1957)
(construing a limitation into an immigration statute in an effort to avoid
constitutional invalidation). See generally Maria V. Morris, The Exit Fiction:
Unconstitutional Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 23 HOUS. J. INT’ L L. 255, 30203 (2001) (discussing specifically the role of constitutional avoidance with respect
to immigration law); Hedberg, supra note 84, at 680-81 (discussing the
relationship between constitutional avoidance and legislative enactments).
88. “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property, without Due
Process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-92; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356
(1997) (imposing detention on dangerous individuals so long as procedural
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90

detention violates the Due Process Clause. Since the proceeding
here was civil and not criminal, the Court examined the
justifications behind indefinite detainment.91
The statute’s purpose is to ensure the appearance of aliens at
future immigration proceedings and prevent danger to the
92
community. The Court concluded that the first justification was
“weak or nonexistent” because the possibility of removal was so
93
remote. The second justification, however, was stronger. The
Court had upheld preventive detention when it applies to
especially dangerous individuals accompanied by strict procedural
94
The Court concluded that civil confinement
safeguards.
extended not only to dangerous individuals but also to other aliens
95
ordered removed for other reasons. Additionally, the Court held,
safeguards exist); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (striking down an
insanity-related detention system in which the burden was on the detainee). See
also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (holding that detainees are
entitled to procedural and substantive Due Process, and establishing a test to
evaluate Due Process concerns).
90. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (concluding that
when the purpose of detention is no longer possible, detention no longer relates
to the purpose for which the individual was detained).
94. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 (holding that
detention for “particularly dangerous individuals” is valid when accompanied by
strict procedural safeguards); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747, 750-52 (holding stringent
time limitations, proof of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence and
existence of judicial safeguards as sufficient procedural safeguards to accompany
pretrial detention). The Court holds that the procedural protections provided in
8 C.F.R. § 241.4 are inadequate because the statute permits indefinite detention
without any substantial protection for those whose rights are being infringed.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692. See also 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2001).
95. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2001) (allowing
detainment of individuals ranging from dangerous suspected terrorists to tourist
visa violators). In light of the recent terrorist attacks, this authorization by the
Court may lead to abuse of discretion, since the INS may detain an individual so
long as the foreseeability of removal exists. Additionally, abuse of discretion may
result from the classification of certain aliens as terrorist or dangerous, since the
Court did not restrict the INS’s authority to detain these types of individuals. See
Civil Rights and Anti-Terrorism Efforts: Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Federalism and Prop. Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (Oct. 3, 2001)
(testimony of David Cole, Professor) (discussing that responsive measures in the
United States should be “measured and effective”). Further, statutory sentences
may be increased in an effort to keep criminal aliens detained for longer periods
of time, subsequently delaying release pending deportation. See Stanley Mailman
& Stephen Yale-Loehr, As The World Turns: Immigration Law Before and After Sept. 11,
226 N.Y. L.J. 3 (Oct. 22, 2001) (discussing the ramifications of September 11 upon
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the procedural protection accorded to these detained individuals
96
was inadequate. As a result, the statute authorizing indefinite
detention raised a “serious constitutional problem” because the
special justifications behind the statute did not outweigh the
97
individual’s liberty interest.
In addition, the Court rejected the government’s contention
that the aliens were not afforded any constitutional rights based on
98
their deportation orders. Rather, the Supreme Court followed
the theory of “entry fiction,” which affords different aliens different
99
rights based on their status at the border. Held to be resident
aliens, both petitioners were entitled to constitutional protection,
100
including Due Process and liberty from physical restraint.
The Court also rejected the government’s contention that
judicial review was unauthorized, under the plenary power
101
doctrine.
Judicial deference, the Court reasoned, is subject to
“important constitutional limitations;”102 thus, the Court is entitled
immigration policies).
96. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692. Generally, the procedural safeguards accorded
to the detainees begins with administrative proceedings in which the alien
incorrectly bears the burden of proving he is not dangerous. Id. Further, these
proceedings are not entitled to later judicial review. Id.; 8 CFR § 241.4(d)(1)
(2001) (imposing the burden on the alien of proving that release “will not pose a
danger to the community . . . or to the safety of other[s]. . . or a significant flight
risk . . . from the United States”). See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes
examining the procedural protections installed by the INS. See infra Part V. and
accompanying notes examining the new interim procedures installed since the
Court’s decision.
97. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752 (establishing the
“Salerno” test to examine the constitutionality of detention, by determining
whether detention is excessive in relation to the purpose of the deprivation). See
generally Montague, supra note 43, at 1477 (discussing how infringement of alien’s
fundamental rights must be narrowly tailored to the government’s interest).
98. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692-93.
99. Id. at 693. Territorial boundaries influence the rights afforded to aliens.
Those outside the United States are not entitled to constitutional protections
available to people that are within the United States’ territorial boundaries. Id.
Once an alien enters the country, the Due Process clause then applies as provided
in the Constitution: to all “persons” within the United States, regardless of whether
or not their “presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary or permanent.” Id. See
also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending Due Process
protection to an alien under final order of deportation). See supra Part II. and
accompanying notes for a historical examination of Due Process protections for
aliens.
100. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
101. Id. at 695. The plenary power doctrine requires judicial deference to the
executive and legislative branches with respect to immigration law. Id.
102. Id. at 696.
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to review whether an individual’s constitutionally protected rights
103
are being infringed. The government also contended that review
was not warranted because, as convicts, the aliens’ liberty interests
were severely diminished. The Court rejected this position by
104
focusing on the constitutional rights of “persons.”
The Court
concluded that the aliens’ liberty interest is strong enough to raise
the question of whether the Constitution permits detention that is
indefinite and potentially permanent. This prevailing liberty
105
interest authorized judicial review.
Despite being presented with a clear constitutional problem,
the Supreme Court also examined the congressional intent and
106
history behind the statute. The Court concluded that statutory
silence does not indicate Congress’ intent to authorize indefinite
107
detention. Further, if Congress intended to authorize indefinite
108
detainment, the statute would have “spoken in clearer terms.”
From a historical perspective, the Court concluded that
despite the statute’s continuous historical change, Congress has
never authorized, nor did it intend to authorize, indefinite and
109
permanent confinement.
Ultimately, the Court followed the
historical theory of constitutional avoidance, and construed the
110
statute to avoid a constitutional threat.
As a result, once the
removal of an alien ordered deported is no longer foreseeable,
111
continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.
In this decision, the Court attacked the indefinite detention of
aliens who have no likelihood of removal based on repatriation
agreements between their native countries and the Untied States.
Rather than directly answering the question of whether indefinite
detention is constitutional, the Court construed the statute to limit
the Attorney General’s authority to detain aliens only for a period
103. Id.
104. Id. at 693. The Court focused on the Fifth Amendment, which forbids the
deprivation of liberty to any “person.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
106. Id. Despite a constitutional problem, if the intent of Congress is clear in
the statute, the Court must respect Congress’ intent. Id. (citing Miller v. French,
530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000)).
107. Id. at 697.
108. Id. Although the statute states that the Attorney General “may” detain an
alien, the Court held this term to be ambiguous and thus did not give the Attorney
General unlimited discretion in alien detainment. Id.
109. Id. at 699.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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112

reasonably necessary to secure removal. Further, the reasonable
time limitation of six months was established in an effort to balance
the competing policy concerns of an individual liberty interest and
113
protection of public safety.
C. The Dissent
Three other dissenters joined in part of Justice Kennedy’s
114
dissent.
They interpreted the Attorney General’s statutory
115
authority to detain criminal aliens absent a specified time limit.
Justice Kennedy contended that the majority “misunderstands” the
116
theory of constitutional avoidance.
Constitutional avoidance
112. Id. at 695, 699. In light of recent developments, it is important to note,
however, that the Court did not take away the Attorney General’s authority to
indefinitely detain terrorist or other dangerous aliens when continued detention
may be warranted and appropriate. Id. at 696; see also Attorney General Issues Interim
Procedure for Post-Order Custody Review After Zadvydas, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1228
(2001) (discussing the Zadvydas decision and the special circumstances warranting
continued detention regardless of removal foreseeability).
113. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680. According to the Court, reasonableness is
measured in terms of the statute’s purpose of assuring the alien’s presence at the
moment of removal. Thus, once removal is no longer foreseeable, detention is
unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute. Id. at 699. Examining the
history of the statute gives specific support to the installation of the six-month time
limit.
The Immigration Act of 1917 established no time limit to effect
deportation, but the Ninth Circuit imposed a four-month “reasonable time” limit.
Wolck v. Weedin, 58 F.2d 928, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1932). In 1952, this Act was
amended to include a six-month limit on the Attorney General’s authority to
detain an alien pending deportation. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 166 (1952)(prior to 1990 amendment) (formerly 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(c)(1952)). In 1990, 1252(c) was amended, authorizing the Attorney
General to detain certain classes of criminal aliens past the reasonable time period
of six months. In 1996, the enactment of the AEDPA and IIRIRA repealed
previous statutes and contained no reasonable time limitation, authorizing the
Attorney General to detain criminal aliens indefinitely. The six-month time limit
is thus evidenced in past legislation. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 504(a), 104 Stat. 5049 (1990)(prior to 1996 amendment)
(formerly 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(A)&(B) (Supp. II 1990)).
114. The dissenters in this case were Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Rhenquist.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705.
115. Id. at 701.
116. Id. at 707. Justice Kennedy defined the issue as whether or not the
“authorization to detain beyond the removal period is subject to the implied,
nontextual limitation that the detention be no longer than reasonably necessary to
effect removal to another country.” Id. He recognized the theory of constitutional
avoidance; however, the interpretation the majority adopted “has no basis in the
language or structure of the INA and . . . contradicts . . . the purpose set forth in
the . . . statutory text.” Id.
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permits courts to choose constructions that are “fairly possible,”
118
but not to extend the construction to the “disingenuous evasion”
of the constitutional question presented. Amending the statute to
include a reasonable time limit would seemingly contradict the
“statutory purpose and design,” which authorizes the Attorney
119
General to detain criminal aliens beyond the removal period.
Further, the dissent challenged, examining the statute itself
120
discourages the inclusion of a reasonable time standard.
Specifically, § 1231(a)(6) authorizes continued detention to both
inadmissible aliens and removable aliens, within the same grant of
121
authority. The majority held that inadmissible aliens “present a
122
very different question”
than that of removable aliens.123
However, the plain meaning of the text does not allow a time limit
124
to be imposed on one class of aliens and not the other.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy contended, the authority of the
Attorney General to detain criminal aliens beyond the removal
125
period extends to both inadmissible aliens and removable aliens.
Justice Kennedy also addressed the constitutional ramifications
associated with the majority holding. First, the judicial judgment
challenged the Legislature’s power over immigration matters.
Second, the judgment also infringed on the Executive’s powers of
discretion and authority over foreign policy matters, thus
126
“weakening the hand of our Government.” Finally, the release of
criminal aliens increased deportation difficulties and the threat of
risk to surrounding communities, directly contradicting the
127
purpose behind immigration regulation. Ultimately, Part I of the
dissent contended that a removable alien lacks the same liberty
128
interest of United States citizens, thus justifying their detention.

117. Id. at 707 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
118. Id. at 707; Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997).
119. Zadyvdas, 533 U.S. at 708. According to Justice Kennedy, the statute was
“straightforward” and the imposition of a time limit by the majority was
unwarranted and improper. Id. at 706-07.
120. Id. at 707.
See, e.g., § 1231(c)(1)(a) and § 1231(c)(3)(A)(ii)(II)
(including explicitly “reasonable time” within their statutory construction).
121. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 708.
122. Id. at 682.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 710.
125. Id. at 711.
126. Id. at 713.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 717.
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In Part II, Justice Kennedy addressed certain circumstances in
which the Court may order an alien’s release. He recognized that
aliens are entitled to Due Process protections, but subject to
limitations and other conditions not applicable to United States
129
citizens.
Admission to the United States is a privilege and is
130
conditioned upon compliance with United States laws. Abuse of
this privilege and violation of the law by the alien breached the
131
alien’s right to remain in the United States. Even so, the dissent
concluded, these aliens are entitled to adequate procedural
132
protections and are entitled to be free from arbitrary detention.
Denial of these protections infringes upon the alien’s rights and
133
permits the alien to seek redress within the judicial system.
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from this portion under
the theory that removable aliens have no constitutional right to be
in the United States. This dissent relied heavily on Shaughnessy v.
134
United States ex rel. Mezei. Mezei held that removable aliens lack the
135
Due Process right to release in the United States.
Further,
according to this dissent, this rule should extend to criminal aliens
under final order of removal, which is suggestively evident in the
136
statute codified by Congress.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’ S DECISION
The Court concluded that judicial review was warranted. It
rejected the theory of judicial deference, examined the rights
afforded to criminal aliens based on the entry fiction doctrine, and
explored the procedural protections currently available to detained

129. Id. at 718; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (discussing
that in its authorization over immigration regulation, “[c]ongress regularly makes
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens”).
130. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491
(1999) (upholding the notion that “deportation is necessary in order to bring an
end to an ongoing violation of United States law”); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (establishing “[t]he purpose of deportation is not to
punish past transgressions but rather put an end to a continuing violation of the
immigration laws”).
131. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 720.
132. Id. at 721. If detention is incident to removal, it is not justified as
punishment nor can the confinement or conditions be penal in nature. Id. See,
e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
133. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 723.
134. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
135. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 703.
136. Id. at 703-05.
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aliens. Recognizing that a constitutional issue presented itself, the
Court faced two main avenues: address the constitutionality of
indefinite detention warranted by the statute, or avoid this
constitutional question by interpreting the statute to include a time
limitation for detention. The Supreme Court correctly evaluated 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) under the theory of constitutional avoidance,
imposing a six-month time limitation on the Attorney General’s
detainment authority.
A. Judicial Review is Warranted
1. Plenary Power
The plenary power doctrine enables the legislative and
executive branches of government to exercise power with respect
137
to certain policies.
This doctrine has been invoked in
immigration matters, which are deemed to be issues of foreign
138
policy. Further, the plenary power doctrine requires the judiciary
to defer issues of immigration to the other branches of government
139
so long as the bounds of the Constitution are not transgressed.
The Court correctly rejected this doctrine based on two grounds:
the issue presented is not one of foreign policy and the regulations
140
imposed by the statute presented a constitutional problem.
The purpose of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) is to prevent flight of
removable aliens and protect the community from dangerous
individuals. This is a domestic issue, not one of foreign policy that
141
ordinarily implicates the plenary power doctrine.
The Court
recognized this difference, stating that when deportable aliens
cannot be removed, they are not “condemned to an indefinite term
142
of imprisonment within the United States.”
The only foreign
137. See, e.g., Hedberg, supra note 84, at 684.
138. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
139. Id. See also Hedberg, supra note 84, at 684 (discussing that absent a
constitutional violation, the courts should not overturn proper exercises of plenary
power with respect to immigration).
140. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96; see also Chopin, supra note 24, at 1297-98.
141. Chopin, supra note 24, at 1297-98; Lisa Cox, Comment, The Legal Limbo of
Indefinite Detention: How Long Can You Go?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 725, 733-34 (2001)
(discussing that plenary power is usually exercised when national security is an
issue or when national sovereignty is affected, as in Mezei); Montague, supra note
43, at 1478 (expelling criminals from the country and preventing further crimes is
a domestic concern, not one of foreign policy).
142. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
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policy consideration presented by the government was the concern
that the judiciary refrain from interference with repatriation
143
negotiations.
The government failed to suggest how a habeas
court’s efforts in determining the likelihood of repatriation
144
affected these negotiations.
Even if the issue was one of foreign policy, the constitutional
issue of indefinite detention of removable aliens prevents judicial
deference to the political branches. The role of the judiciary is to
ensure that regulations enacted by the executive and legislative
145
branches conform to the standards set forth in the Constitution.
All persons within the United States are entitled to Due Process,
146
including removable aliens. The Court concluded that indefinite
detention challenged these Due Process rights, and therefore
147
judicial deference was not warranted.
2. Entry Fiction
The Court further examined Due Process rights to determine
if Zadvydas and Ma were even entitled to judicial review as resident
aliens. The Court correctly examined the entry fiction doctrine.
Following Mezei, the Court maintained the distinction between
148
removable and inadmissible aliens and their respective rights.
Under Mezei, indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens is
149
constitutional.
However, removable aliens are entitled to both
150
substantive and procedural Due Process rights. Even though it is
arguable that aliens lose all of these rights once they commit a
151
crime, common law does not recognize this nor does the

143. Id. at 696.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 689; see, e.g., Hedberg, supra note 84, at 684. See generally Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the doctrine of judicial
review).
146. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
147. Id. at 690.
148. E.g., Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953).
149. Id.
150. E.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
151. Failure to comply with these laws renders the alien’s right to residence
void. Id. at 236-37. The right to exclude an alien is a sovereign national right.
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210. It is undisputed, however, that once an alien is admitted a
government cannot then decide if the alien should be excluded without Due
Process. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982). See also Clay McClasin,
Comment, My Jailor is My Judge: Kestutis Zadvydas and the Indefinite Imprisonment of
Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75 TUL. L. REV. 193, 215 (2000).
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152

Supreme Court. Zadvydas, since 1956, and Ma, since 1984, have
153
been permanent resident aliens in the United States. Though
their histories have been stained by constant criminal activity, and
they are under final orders of deportation, they are nonetheless
removable aliens entitled to Due Process protection, including
judicial review.
3. Due Process Protection
The Court acknowledged that Zadvydas and Ma were entitled
154
to Due Process protections. These protections are separated into
two distinct prongs: procedural and substantive. It has been held
in some cases that indefinite detention is warranted so long as
155
adequate procedural protections exist. The Court correctly held
156
that the procedures enacted by the INS were insufficient.
In order to qualify for release under these procedures, the
burden of proof incorrectly rested on the alien to show that there
was no threat to the community nor did the risk of flight exist.
Further, even if the government found that the alien satisfied the
burden, release was still within the Attorney General’s discretionary
authority. This authority was final; judicial review was not
157
authorized.
Though the INS attempted to remedy these
procedural inadequacies in the Pearson Memorandum, the interim
158
procedures were insufficient.
These procedural defects
warranted judicial review.
Unfortunately, the Court circumvented the issue of substantive
Due Process. Instead of attacking indefinite detention as
unconstitutional, the Court interpreted the statute to avoid this
159
constitutional defect. This interpretation imposed a six-month
reasonable time limit on detention of removable aliens awaiting
160
deportation.
Implicitly, the Court created substantive Due
152. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 228. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
153. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684.
154. Id. at 694.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
156. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Though enacted by the INS to supplement 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 is insufficient in comparison to the
deprivation of liberty. Id. at 692.
157. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1) (2001); Capitaine, supra note 12, at 780-81.
158. Pearson, supra note 46; Capitaine, supra note 12, at 781-82 (discussing the
procedures introduced in the Pearson Memorandum).
159. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
160. Id. at 701.
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Process rights for aliens not thought to exist before.
Even though it was not a direct constitutional ruling, the
statutory interpretation was cognizant of basic constitutional
norms. Indefinite detention of resident aliens infringes upon the
162
fundamental right of liberty.
When a constitutional issue
presents itself, the Court may not defer to another political
163
branch. The Court followed Mezei and recognized Zadvydas and
Ma as resident aliens, entitled to Due Process under the
Constitution. Further, even though these aliens were criminals,
164
their Due Process rights were not diminished. “Irrespective of
the procedures used,” the Court held that the aliens’ liberty
interests are strong enough to question the constitutionality of
165
indefinite detention.
However, the Court did not apply the
substantive Due Process standard but followed constitutional
avoidance.
If the Court had applied the substantive Due Process test, it
likely would have found that indefinite detention is
unconstitutional. To analyze substantive Due Process rights, the
Court must evaluate: 1) the right being asserted; 2) whether or not
this right is fundamental; 3) and if so, whether detainment is
166
justified to serve a compelling government interest. Further, the
regulatory means must not be excessive in serving the
167
governmental interest.
Petitioners contend that their fundamental liberty interests are
161. Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Trims Congress’ Sails on Immigration Control, 76
M IAMI DAILY BUS. REV. 22 (July 11, 2001) (discussing the Court’s refusal to defer
immigration matters to other branches, and ultimately limiting Congress’ power to
control immigration even when anti-immigration sentiments are high).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
163. E.g., Hedberg, supra note 84, at 684.
164. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
165. Id. The government disagreed that review was warranted based on
plenary power, entry fiction, procedural Due Process and substantive Due Process.
Id. See also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (prohibiting certain
government actions notwithstanding the fairness of the procedures used and
discussing that an individual’s liberty interest is the most basic and essential
liberty). Further, Foucha and Salerno together exemplify the Due Process standard
for claims of unconstitutional infringement on the right to be free from physical
restraint. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739. However, rather than
evaluate the petitioners’ claim in light of this standard, the Court followed the
theory of constitutional avoidance. Acosta, supra note 14, at 1380, 1387-94.
166. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750-52 (discussing whether detention is excessive in
relation to the purpose for the liberty deprivation).
167. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752; Acosta, supra note 14, at
1377.
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being infringed. Foucha established three circumstances in which
the government’s interest outweighs the individual’s liberty
interest: 1) punitive detainment of convicted criminals; 2)
psychiatric civil detainment if an individual is mentally ill and
dangerous to self and community; and 3) detainment of potentially
168
dangerous persons in narrowly prescribed circumstances. Here,
the question is whether the indefinite detention is a legitimate
means to ensure the government’s efficient execution of removal.
As the Court found, once deportation is unlikely, the government
169
lacks the compelling interest to continually detain the individual.
Further, if detention is indefinite, it cannot constitute the least
regulatory means of achieving efficient enforcement of deportation
laws, because eventually the individual’s interest outweighs any
170
governmental interest.
Therefore, indefinite detention is a
171
violation of substantive Due Process and thus is unconstitutional.
B. Statutory Interpretation
1. Traditional Interpretation
The Supreme Court has long held that courts should interpret
statutes in a manner that avoids deciding substantial constitutional
172
questions.
There are many approaches to statutory
173
interpretation. The traditional approach, or plain meaning rule,
requires the court to look at the statute’s history, underlying policy
174
and structure. As a result, the courts should not alter the statute
by reading words or elements into the statute that are not explicitly

168. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80-83; Acosta, supra note 14, at 1380.
169. Zadvydas, 533 U.S at 690. The government does maintain a compelling
interest to maintain control over borders and ensure safety within its jurisdiction.
However, this does not justify indefinite detention. Nor should courts assume that
Congress implicitly intended such a denial of Due Process. Montague, supra note
43, at 1486.
170. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
171. See generally Acosta, supra note 14, at 1391-94 (discussing a substantive Due
Process analysis of Zadvydas).
172. United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 673 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
this is the “paramount principle of judicial restraint”), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 961
(1992).
173. See Hedberg, supra note 84, at 680-84 (discussing the history of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and the theories behind statutory
interpretation).
174. See id.
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present. Ultimately, a court may not redraft a statute. Here, if
the Court had followed this theory, the statute would lack the time
limitation because it is not explicitly present.
2. Judicial Deference
Judicial deference requires that if the statute is silent or
ambiguous, the judiciary is not to impose an interpretation of a
statute over the interpretation of a governmental branch, especially
176
if the branch has more expertise within the specific area. This is
founded on the belief that appointed agencies are better
177
positioned to make specific decisions. However, this deference is
178
only warranted if there is no constitutional violation. The Court
could not follow this theory because of the Due Process
transgressions.
3. Constitutional Avoidance
Instead, the Court followed constitutional avoidance. This
theory is founded on the concern that constitutional issues should
179
be addressed only when necessary. Fundamentally, Congress is
bound by a duty to uphold the Constitution, and therefore, courts
should presume that legislative enactments are intended to adhere
180
to constitutional requirements.
This theory is followed when
plain language is ambiguous, but is not a “license for the judiciary
181
to rewrite the language” of the legislature. Further, this theory
may not be used as a “disingenuous” attempt to avoid constitutional
182
questions. However, by examining the statute’s history and the
existence of time limitations in previous enactments, the Court
correctly construed a six-month time limitation into the statute.
Through the addition of this time limitation, the Court avoided
unnecessarily addressing the constitutionality of indefinite
detainment. The Court has a duty to evaluate the constitutionality
175. See id.
176. See id. at 681-82.
177. See id. at 682.
178. See id. at 684.
179. See id. at 681.
180. See id.
181. See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)
(discussing the theory of constitutional avoidance).
182. Hedberg, supra note 84, at 681; George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289
U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (discussing limitations on constitutional
avoidance).
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of legislative enactments; the legislature is bound to uphold the
constitution.
Constitutional avoidance best follows this
presumption. This interpretation prevented the invalidation of the
statute, maintaining the Attorney General’s authority but
183
restricting it to constitutional limitations.
C. The Impact of the Decision
Though this decision specifically applies to removable resident
184
aliens, it has had mixed application to inadmissible aliens. The
Sixth Circuit, interpreting Zadvydas, has held that the indefinite
185
detention of inadmissible aliens is constitutional. Conversely, a
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit extended Zadvydas to apply to
186
inadmissible aliens.
The majority on that panel noted that 8
U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) does not draw a distinction between
removable and inadmissible aliens, and therefore Zadvydas applies
187
to all categories of aliens covered by the statute.
Thus, the
Supreme Court will have to address the constitutionality of
indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens in the future.
This decision is not without ramifications, most of which will
be felt in the United States. As Justice Kennedy passionately stated,
this decision will “ensure these dangerous individuals, and
188
hundreds more like them, will remain free.” First, requiring the
INS to release these aliens strips the government of its
183. If the Court would have followed the dissent by deciding that the statute
authorized indefinite detainment, then the constitutional issue could not have
been avoided. As a result, the statute would be declared unconstitutional,
removing the Attorney General’s authority to detain. See Coyle, supra note 161.
184. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
185. Carballo v. Luttrell, 2001 WL 1194699 (6th Cir. Oct 11, 2001) (overruling
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2001)). Carballo specifically
applied to the indefinite detention of Mariel Cubans. Id.; “Ninth Circuit Holds
Indefinite Detention of Inadmissible Aliens Not Permissible Under Zadvydas,”
IMMIGRATION BUS. NEWS. & COMMENT DAILY 42 (Oct. 3, 2002).
186. Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002). The court specifically noted that
its decision does not extend to detained terrorists, which is governed by the
PATRIOT Act. Id. at 839.
187. Id. at 836; but see Morales v. Conley, 224 F.Supp.2d 1070 (S.D. W. Va.
2002) (distinguishing from Zadvydas because Morales was inadmissible and has
been since 1992, and Zadvydas does not apply to aliens excluded before 1997);
Gomez v. Benov, 2002 WL 31261162 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2002) (declaring 8 U.S.C. §
1231 (a)(6) inapplicable to aliens determined inadmissible prior to October 30,
1996, as the IIRIRA was not enacted (and thus the previous codified INA
applied)).
188. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 716 (dissenting).
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constitutionally guaranteed power to establish a uniform rule of
189
naturalization. It makes a “mockery” of the Constitution.
It
allows aliens which the government wishes to exclude to remain
free within the United States. This ultimately results in lost control
over territorial borders, which is an inherent national sovereign
190
power.
Second, it detrimentally affects foreign policy and repatriation
negotiations. Rather than encourage international agreement, the
decision conveys to foreign nations that the United States will take
191
any and all immigrants.
It results in the release of violent
criminals simply because their country of origin “refuses to live up
192
to its obligations under international law.”
It creates less
incentive for removable aliens to facilitate expeditious removal to
their home countries, and it encourages aliens to not cooperate so
193
that deportation is not deemed foreseeable.
Third, release of these aliens may increase crime, rather than
prevent it. If aliens are not detained, they may commit crimes
against the general population, which they would not have been
194
able to commit had they been detained. Additionally, releasing
an alien pending deportation increases the risk of unsuccessful
deportation, because it is likely that the alien will disappear into the
195
country, frustrating the process.
Despite these ramifications, ultimately, and most importantly,
the Court affirmed the very core of our system of justice, Due
Process. Prior to the Zadvydas decision, over 3,500 aliens who had
already served criminal sentences remained detained mainly
because their countries of origin had no diplomatic ties with the

189. E.g., Daniel R. Dinger, When We Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain? An
Analysis of the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) and the INS
Interim Procedures Governing Detention, 00 BYU L. REV. 1551, 1589-90 (2000).
190. See id.; Montague, supra note 43, at 1486.
191. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 711; see Dinger, supra note 189, at 1590.
192. Post-Order Custody Review after Zadvydas v. Davis, 8 C.F.R. § 241 (2001).
193. Zadvydas, 533 U.S at 713.
194. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 296 (5th Cir. 1999).
195. Id. at 297. Justice Kennedy’s dissent also stated that the ruling causes a
“systemic dislocation in the balance of powers, thus raising serious constitutional
concerns not just for the cases at hand but for the Court’s own view of its proper
authority.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705. Further, “this rule . . . invites potentially
perverse results.” Id. at 715. Specifically, he noted that other nations may bar
admission of certain criminal aliens, thus resulting in release of these aliens into
the United States. Id. See generally Morris, supra note 87, at 293-96 (defining the
governmental interests behind detainment).
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196

United States. As a result of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the Attorney
General was authorized to indefinitely detain these individuals until
197
deportation was effectuated. This decision has affected most of
these detained aliens, granting them greater review opportunities
and release. Further, the decision reflects that the interests of the
United States must be balanced against global realities. It
promotes international law-making and global cooperation, while
maintaining a priority for individual rights and global interests.
198
Ultimately, it suggests an aspiration for justice and fairness to all.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court correctly read an implicit time limitation
into 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), limiting the Attorney General’s
authority to detain a criminal alien to six months. Following the
decision, the Attorney General immediately ordered the INS to
199
adopt new procedures to take effect July 31, 2001. On August 2,
2001, a new bill was introduced to the House of Representatives,
entitled the Immigrant Fairness and Restoration Act of 2001. The
purpose of this act is to amend the Immigration and Nationality
Act, and “to modify restrictions added by the Illegal Immigration
200
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996.” On August
7, 2001, the State Department declared its plans to assist the INS in
196. Chopin, supra note 24, at 1262.
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2001).
198. Noah Benjamin Novogrodsky & Urs Cipolat, Justice Goes Global: Are We
Finally Moving Beyond National Interests?, THE RECORDER 138 (July 18, 2001).
199. Post-Order Custody Review after Zadvydas v. Davis, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,433
(July 24, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 241). The Attorney General specifically
required that the new procedures provide regulations for determining the
likelihood of removal, ramifications for failure to comply with the regulations, and
also required special regulations to be enacted in specific circumstances, such as
for terrorists or other dangerous individuals. In the interim, the Attorney General
provided procedures to be followed until the INS had adopted regulations in light
of Zadvydas. Id.
200. H.R. 2772, 107th Cong., (2001). Specifically, the Act required judicial
review of immigration orders and amended 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). The
amendment included a provision that detention shall not exceed reasonable time,
“not to exceed 9 months.” It also required continued review by the Attorney
General every 90 days following the removal period. Ultimately, these decisions
are subject to de novo review by an immigration judge and administrative appeal,
and the burden is upon the Attorney General to prove that continued detention is
authorized. Id. §§ 8(c)-(d). As of October 10, 2001, the Bill remained stagnant in
the House Judiciary committee. The Bill was reintroduced by Rep. Conyers in
H.R. 3894, 107th Cong. (2002) (entitled Restoration of Fairness in Immigration
Act of 2002).
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the repatriation of detained criminal aliens. Specifically, the State
Department will continue its diplomatic efforts to “enhance [their]
201
cooperation with host governments.”
However, in light of the terrorist attacks on September 11, the
progress of this bill has slowed and the Attorney General’s
authority has increased to protect the United States. On October
2, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act (Provide Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) was introduced
and passed by Congress.202 To specifically conform to the Zadvydas
decision, the Act included an amendment that would require
release after six months of any alien whose removal to another
country could not be effected in the foreseeable future. However,
the release could not “jeopardize the national security of the U.S.,
203
or the safety of an individual or community.” This amendment
shows Congress’ attempt to respect the Zadvydas decision, however,
204
implementation is a different story.
It is possible that the
discretion of the Attorney General will not be challenged with
respect to criminal aliens.
In fact, this underlying principle of justice has already been
thwarted since September 11. In an attempt to preserve “the
205
precious Bill of Rights,” the Attorney General has “rounded up”
206
thousands of immigrants and detained them in “secret custody.”
Being held as “material witnesses,” they are being detained
207
indefinitely by the government. This seems to directly contradict
the Zadvydas decision and its reaffirmance of the extension of Due

201. State Dept. Plans to Assist INS in Repatriating Detained Criminal Aliens After
Zadvydas, 78 No. 31 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 1314 (Aug. 13, 2001) (stating that the
“bottom line is that . . . we must intensify [U.S. Government] efforts to convince
countries to fulfill their obligations to accept return of their nationals”).
202. H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. 2001.
203. See Antiterrorism Legislation Gains Momentum in Both Chambers; LawMakers
Offer Assorted Stand-Alone Bills, 78 No. 39 Interpreter Releases 1591 (October 8,
2001).
204. Civil Rights and Antiterrorism Efforts: Testimony of Professor David Cole on Civil
Liberties and Proposed Antiterrorism Legislation Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th
Cong. (Oct. 3, 2001) (discussing the Bush Administration’s proposal of new law
enforcement powers as “unnecessarily sacrific[ing] our commitment to both equal
treatment and political freedom,” and the PATRIOT Act’s attempt to mitigate
some aspects of this proposal but failing and remaining unconstitutional).
205. Nat Hentoff, Round Up the Usual Suspects; FBI is Trampling All Over the Bill of
Rights, WASH. TIMES , Oct. 29, 2001, at A21.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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208

Process to all persons.
If Zadvydas were decided this term, it is doubtful that the same
209
conclusion would be reached. Case law holds that in times of war
or insurrection, the government has full authority to detain
210
individuals believed to be dangerous.
National security is of
heightened concern, which undoubtedly affects the Court’s
decisions. Specifically, a compelling governmental interest clearly
exists to protect the United States. from further terrorist attacks;
211
thus, detainment of criminal aliens may be justified. Again, in
the current climate, it is likely that Zadvydas would have been
212
decided differently.
The United States has had an “open door” policy since its
213
inception. A core principle of this great nation is the right to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Balancing the inherent right
208. Id.
209. Lyle Denniston, Detentions in Terror Probe May Reach Supreme Court, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2001, at A9 (discussing that focus by the Court on civil liberties
“may be sharply curtailed” and increased deference given to government officials).
Justice O’Connor stated “we’re likely to experience more restrictions on our
personal freedom than has ever been the case before.” Id.
210. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987); see also Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approving unreviewable executive power to detain
enemy aliens in times of war).
211. But see Civil Rights and Anti-Terrorism Efforts: Testimony of Professor David Cole
on Civil Liberties and Proposed Anti-Terrorism Legislation Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th
Cong. (Oct. 3, 2001). The assurance of safety both home and abroad is of
heightened concern since the terrorist attacks. However, a legal response should
be “measured and effective.” Id. Professor Cole contends that three principles
must guide the United States’ response to terrorism: prevention of overreaction,
maintenance of the “bedrock foundations” of the constitution (freedom and equal
treatment), and establishment of a balance between liberty and security, without
sacrificing vulnerable minority liberties. Id. Legislative enactments must reflect
these principles. Id. It is said that in battling terrorism, we are fighting for our
“commitment to freedom;” this need not be traded to maintain security. Cole
concludes, “[M]aintaining our freedoms is itself critical to maintaining our
security.” Id.
212. Tony Mauro, Business as Usual as Possible: the Supreme Court Raises the
Curtain on a Term that has been Touched by the Near War-Time Footing of the Nation’s
Capital, 166 N.J. L.J. 1 (2001) (discussing how war has found its way onto the
Court’s docket, and that issues presented during times of conflict are usually
“colored by wartime sensibilities”). Susan Herman, a Brooklyn Law School
Professor and General Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, stated
“[l]ast year’s docket would have been tremendously affected,” emerging
differently in a wartime perspective. Id.
213. See Mailman, supra note 95, at 3 (discussing more restrictive immigration
measures, upcoming legislation, and the idea of keeping out terrorists without
shutting U.S. borders).
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of the individual with compelling governmental interests, the Court
correctly decided that when deportation of a resident criminal
alien is not foreseeable, indefinite detention is not warranted. So
long as the government enacts effective procedures and abuse of
discretion is reviewed, both the rights of individuals and the right
of this nation to protect its citizens can best be achieved.
Eventually, the Court will have to directly face the constitutionality
214
of indefinite detention. It will be interesting to see how the core
principle of American justice, freedom, will be sustained.

214. The decision did not directly address the constitutionality of indefinite
detention. “It’s a good decision, but it was only on statutory grounds . . . there
needs to be much more clarification in the case.” John Council & Jonathan
Ringel, Immigrants Can’t Linger in Limbo Indefinitely, 17 TEX . L. 18 (July 9, 2001).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/8

30

